Assignment on NPM “Shai-Hulud” Supply-Chain Attack — Response Exercise
Cybersecurity
Assignment on NPM “Shai-Hulud” Supply-Chain Attack — Response Exercise
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Description of the Issue:
In September 2025, more than 40 NPM packages were compromised in a large-scale supply-chain attack. The malware executes during installs, steals secrets, and persists through GitHub workflows.
Read more here: StepSecurity:
Task:
Assume your organization is impacted. Write a short report covering:
How you discovered the impact.
What remediation actions you took.
What lessons your team learned.
Deliverable: 1–2 pages (bullet points or short essay
4 Comments
Incident Report: Shai-Hulud npm Supply Chain Attack Impact
Role: Vulnerability Management Analyst
Date: 2025-09-20
Prepared for: Security Leadership, Engineering, Risk Management
*Our vulnerability management team identified potential exposure through integrated threat intelligence and automated security tooling.
*Recorded Future flagged the presence of the `.github/workflows/shai-hulud-workflow.yml` file in multiple internal GitHub repositories tied to our developers.
*Custom scans with Tenable/Nessus detected compromised npm packages, notably `@ctrl/tinycolor`, on developer machines and CI environments, highlighting suspicious postinstall scripts and unauthorized package updates.
* Snyk’s Software Composition Analysis revealed multiple internal applications using vulnerable versions of affected npm packages, including risky transitive dependencies.
* Splunk SIEM provided behavioral alerts on outbound HTTP traffic to known exfiltration domains (`webhook.site`) and unauthorized npm publish events, confirming active compromise indicators.
Remediation Actions Taken
*Immediately quarantined affected endpoints and prioritized patching for compromised assets based on Tenable scan results.
* Removed the malicious `.github/workflows/shai-hulud-workflow.yml` files from all impacted repositories to halt persistence mechanisms.
* Collaborated with IAM and DevSecOps teams to rotate all GitHub, npm, and cloud credentials (AWS, GCP), revoking potentially exposed tokens discovered via secret scanning tools (TruffleHog).
* Blocked all network traffic to known attacker command and control and data exfiltration domains to curb ongoing communication.
* Leveraged GitHub Advanced Security for deep repository scans looking for residual secrets or anomalous workflows, enabling push protection and dependency review on high-risk projects.
* Conducted a comprehensive Snyk-powered Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) audit to validate the integrity of dependencies across CI/CD pipelines and artifact repositories.
Lessons Learned
*Tool Integration Is Crucial: The attack was not detectable through a single scanner or alert but required combined intelligence from Tenable, Snyk, Recorded Future, and GitHub Security tools.
* CVE-Focused Models Are Insufficient: Supply chain compromise tactics bypass traditional vulnerability CVE models and focus more on artifact provenance, behavioral analysis, and runtime monitoring.
* Credential Exposure Risks Are Higher Than Expected: Secrets stored in code repositories and local environments are prime targets; continuous secret scanning and credential lifecycle governance must be prioritized.
* CI/CD Pipeline Security Needs Strengthening: Blocking workflow injection demands enforced branch protections, mandatory code reviews, signed commits, and runtime protection of CI runners.
* Severity Scoring Requires Adaptation: Traditional CVSS does not capture systemic risks like lateral credential theft and persistence; internal scoring models must adjust to supply chain attack vectors.
Conclusion
The Shai-Hulud campaign exposed critical gaps in supply chain defenses and demonstrated the severity of credential harvesting combined with CI/CD pipeline compromise. Our team responded swiftly with multi-tool detection, containment, credential rotation, and enhanced auditing. We are now advancing toward integrated, behavior-focused vulnerability management and zero-trust pipeline security to mitigate future risks effectively.
Security Incident Report: “Shai‑Hulud / ctrl‑tinycolor + 40+ Packages” Supply‑Chain Attack
Date of Report: 9/20/25
Incident Identifier: SC‑2025‑09‑ctrl‑tinycolor
Reported by: Faith Efetevbia
Severity Level: High – potential credential exposure, supply‑chain propagation, CI/CD compromise
According to Ashish Kurmi with StepSecurity, our threat monitoring systems / security news sources alerted us to a major supply‐chain compromise in the NPM ecosystem: the package @ctrl/tinycolor (and 40+ others) had been injected with malicious code under what StepSecurity is calling the Shai‑Hulud attack.
The malicious versions published a bundle.js during npm install, which included code to:
– Harvest credentials (AWS/GCP/Azure, GitHub, NPM tokens, etc.).
– Establish persistence by injecting or creating malicious GitHub Actions workflows (shai‑hulud‑workflow.yml).
– Self‑propagate by pushing malicious patches to other packages under maintainer control.
We detected that we had dependencies (direct or transitive) on these packages when running dependency scans.
2. Remediation Actions Taken
Containment:
– Identified repos using affected packages.
– Removed/updated compromised packages.
– Searched for malicious bundle.js (SHA‑256: 46faab8ab153fae6e80e7cca38eab363075bb524edd79e42269217a083628f09).
– Searched for malicious GitHub workflow (shai‑hulud‑workflow.yml).
Credential & Access Remediation:
– Rotated GitHub, NPM, AWS, GCP, Azure, and CI/CD credentials.
Audit & Forensics:
– Reviewed audit logs (GitHub, AWS CloudTrail, GCP).
– Checked unusual IAM activity and GitHub pushes.
Recovery & Hardening:
– Updated dependency scanning and blocked malicious packages.
– Strengthened GitHub security controls.
– Scheduled credential rotation.
Communication:
– Notified stakeholders and documented Indicators of Compromise (IOCs).
3. Impact Assessment
– Codebases affected: several internal services.
– Credential exposure: treated as compromised; rotated.
– Operational disruption: minor build failures.
– Data exfiltration: no evidence found.
4. Lessons Learned & Improvements
1. Supply Chain Risk is escalating.
2. Proactive dependency monitoring is critical.
3. CI/CD guardrails are needed.
4. Credential hygiene must improve.
5. Detection & response readiness is essential.
6. Developer awareness and training are required.
7. Vendor/maintainer vetting should be enforced.
5. Recommendations / Next Steps
– Formalize dependency update policy.
– Adopt anomaly detection tools (e.g., Harden‑Runner).
– Quarterly secret rotation.
– Maintain curated trusted packages list.
– Consider internal NPM registry.
– Establish threat intelligence monitoring.
6. Status
– All immediate remediation actions completed.
– Investigation ongoing.
– Hardening measures in progress.
Summary
This incident highlights sophisticated supply‑chain attacks combining dependency compromise, credential harvesting, and CI/CD backdoors. Our response minimized impact, but ongoing vigilance is required.
Sources
StepSecurity Blog – ‘ctrl‑tinycolor and 40+ npm packages compromised’
https://stepsecurity.io/blog/ctrl-tinycolor-and-40-npm-packages-compromised
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